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The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest
Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court
Jurisdiction over Indian Cases
Michael C. Blumm*
Michael Cadigan **
We were unable to meet the challenge of the editors to
dream the next quinticentennial of Indian law. But with our
eyes fixed firmly on the next generation or so of Indian law
cases, we unabashedly propose a small change in court jurisdiction over Indian cases: we propose to eliminate the
Supreme Court from Indian law.
Over the last two decades, the Court has strayed from the
concept of Indian tribes as nations within a nation,' indicating
a profound lack of sensitivity to Indian affairs by ratifying numerous state regulations that undermine tribal sovereignty.2
The Court has been particularly unwavering in dismantling
tribal authority to regulate non-Indian activities on reservations. For example, in recent years the Court has ruled that
tribes lack on-reservation criminal jurisdiction over non-members.3 The Court has refused to find tribal authority to zone
reservation lands which Congress, in a misguided nineteenth
century attempt to break up reservations, opened to homesteading.' The Court also has circumscribed general tribal
regulation of hunting and fishing on non-Indian owned reser*
Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College.
** J.D. 1992, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College.
1. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). See also Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts
and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 847-48 (1990) (discussing
Worcester).
2. See Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FoUND.
REs. J. 1.

3. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see also Duro v.
Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (no tribal jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanors committed by nonmembers on reservation).
4. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989) (no tribal authority to zone fee lands owned by nonmembers). See
generally Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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vation lands.5
In addition to restricting tribal authorities, the Court has
ratified numerous state incursions on reservations, making tribal status as nations within a nation a hollow promise. According to the Court, a state may tax reservation lands owned
in fee,6 tax cigarette sales on a reservation, 7 tax mineral severance on reservation lands leased to non-Indians, and regulate
reservation liquor sales.9 States may even prohibit Indian religious practices in the interest of controlling drug abuse, 10 and
the Court has allowed the federal government to destroy Indian sacred sites to build roads and harvest timber. The
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by
the Court, provides precious little protection for Indian
religion.
At the same time it has undermined tribal sovereign powers, the Court has diminished tribal property rights. For example, the Court has ruled that when Congress acts as trustee
of tribal property, the disposition of tribal assets is not a taking and does not entitle the tribes to just compensation. 2
5. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see also Oregon Dep't of Fish
and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (state may regulate Indian
hunting and fishing on lands ceded by the tribe where the cession did not indicate an
intent to retain hunting and fishing rights).
6. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
7. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state may tax cigarette sales to nonmembers of tribe); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of
the Patawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991) (upholding state cigarette taxes on
sales from a store located on trust land).
8. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
9. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
10. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Services v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
11. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see
Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in FederalIndian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1827-37 (1990).
12. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980) (the United
States as trustee may change the form of trust assets as long as it, in good faith, attempts
to provide property of equivalent value); see Nell Jessup Newton, The JudicialRole in
Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land. An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR.
L. REV. 245 (1982); see also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85
(1955) (federal seizure of Indian land held under aboriginal title not protected by the
Fifth Amendment); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title
Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of
Barbarism:The ContemporaryLegacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of FederalIndian Law, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 237, 250-53 (1989).
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Furthermore, even when just compensation is required and
has been paid, the government has no obligation to see to it
that the money reaches those whose property was taken. 3
Nor is compensation due when tribal property has been damaged by government actions promoting navigation. 14 Similarly, tribal consent to hydroelectric projects situated on
reservations is unnecessary. I5 With regard to choice of forum,
tribes cannot prevent their reserved water16 rights from being
adjudicated in (often hostile) state courts.
Joseph Singer recently explained how the Court has diminished both Indian sovereignty and property rights by classifying tribal interests as sovereign concerns when tribes
would benefit from being treated as property owners, and classifying tribes as private associations when they would benefit
from treatment as sovereigns.1 7 This reasoning has enabled
the Court to uphold federal seizures of Indian property rights
under the guise of diminishing tribal sovereignty, while limiting tribal authority over non-members who inhabit reservation land and who use reservation resources. Singer claims:
The Supreme Court's failure over the last fifteen years to
identify American Indian claims as protectable property
rights has resulted in greater and greater intrusions into
the interests of Indian nations. By often failing to recognize treaties either as creating vested property rights or as
describing reserved powers of sovereignty, the Court has
perpetuated a system that grants less protection to the
property rights of American Indian nations than to the
property rights of non-Indians and non-Indian corporate
entities. The Supreme Court has defined as exercises of
sovereignty by Indian nations actions that would be recog13. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1985) (the United States made
"payment" when funds were deposited into a trust account).
14. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1987).
15. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. LaJolla, Rincon, San Pasquel, Pauma, & Palm
Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 784-87 (1984) (tribes have no greater power to
stop a project than would a private landowner).

16. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 566-70 (1983); see generally Robert E. Beck, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.04(a)(1) (1991) (discussing
the McCarren Amendment).
17. Singer, supra note 4, at 55; see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1984)
(noting that Indian tribes fit neither a model of state sovereignty nor private association,
making them vulnerable to infringement of both property and sovereign interests).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986609

206

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:203

nized as exercises of property rights by business corporations; then, by holding that there can be no rival
sovereigns to the states and the federal government, the
Court has cut back on both tribal sovereignty and property. In this way, the Court has deprived Indian nations
of protection for interests that are routinely recognized in

the non-Indian context.
The Supreme Court has therefore given Indian nations the worst of both worlds. They are often not treated
as property owners for the purpose of protection from
confiscation of their property by the state, and they are

often not treated as sovereigns for the purpose of governing the conduct of nonmembers inside their territory."8
The Court's hostility to Indian cases has reached even
popular culture. In The Brethren, Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong infer that Chief Justice Burger's displeasure with a
Christmas party skit earned Justice Rehnquist an Indian case
assignment, and Rehnquist's contempt for Indian cases produced a result that emasculated the Indian commerce clause.' 9
Felix Cohen once suggested that Indian law is the functional equivalent of the miner's canary, 20 the ultimate reflection of the conquering people's tolerance and wisdom. The
Supreme Court's decisions over the last decade or so indicate
that the Court has become oblivious to Cohen's insight. Instead, the Court appears to view Indian cases as technical
quirks in which a special interest group seeks an exemption
from the rules governing the rest of the population.2
Because we think the Court's hostility to the concept of
Indian sovereignty is misguided, we propose that Congress
and the President create a replacement for the Supreme Court
as the court of last resort in Indian cases. Our proposed Indian Court of Appeals would consist of panels selected from
18. Singer, supra note 4, at 54-56 (citation omitted).
19. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 412 (1979), quoted
in Michael Minnis, Judicially-SuggestedHarassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis
Revisit Moe and Colville, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 289 (1991). The resulting case, Moe
v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), held that Montana
could force Indian cigarette vendors to collect a state sales tax.
20. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bu-

reaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
21. See Ball, supra note 2, at 121.
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interested circuit and district court judges and would be responsible only for resolving splits among the circuit courts.
Thus, we would preserve a tertiary level of federal court review to ensure national uniformity of Indian law. However,
this uniformity would be created by judges who are interested
in Indian cases and who think Indian law is an important subject of federal law. Because of the fact-specific nature of most
Indian cases, the circuit courts are usually the appropriate final arbiters of Indian disputes. And since Indian cases constitute a small portion of an already overloaded Supreme Court
docket, we do not view removal of cases to the new Indian
court as a substantial restriction on the Court's appellate
jurisdiction.
Our analysis is in four parts. Section I explains how and
why the Supreme Court has shown itself incapable respecting
Indian governmental sovereignty. Section II argues that eliminating the Court's jurisdiction over Indian cases is constitutional under Article III's Exceptions Clause. Section III
contends that it is not entirely politically unrealistic to expect
Congress to restrict the Court's jurisdiction in such a fashion.
Section IV concludes that congressional invocation of the Exceptions Clause to displace Supreme Court review of Indian
cases with an Indian Court of Appeals would produce better
reasoned Indian cases and might provide a valuable case study
of one approach to responding to an overburdened Supreme
Court.22
I. WHY SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OVER
INDIAN CASES OUGHT TO BE ELIMINATED
Commentators 23 and Supreme Court justices24 alike agree
22. The Supreme Court's crushing workload has been well documented, and many
solutions have been proposed. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland,
The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400 (1987). However, the
increase in the number of petitions for certiorari has recently leveled off at about 5,000
per year. Kenneth W. Starr, The Courts ofAppeals and the Future of the FederalJudiciary, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1991).
23. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, State Power over Indian Reservations: A Critical
Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. REV. 434 (1981): "[T]he Burger Court
has unsettled [its] long-established, constitutionally-based tradition and has embarked
on an uncharted course of enlarging the scope of state jurisdiction in Indian country in
the absence of congressional statutes"; Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians:Back to
Basics, 62 OR. L. REV. 29, 30-31 (1983): "The Court's lack of consistency and predict-
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that over the past two decades the Supreme Court has shown
little adherence to precedent in Indian cases, militating in
favor of abolishing the Court's jurisdiction over Indian cases.
Another reason why Congress should remove the Court's jurisdiction over Indian law cases stems from the Court's refusal
to adhere to established principals of Indian law, such as tribal
sovereignty and Congress's exclusive right to regulate Indians.
Additionally, the Court has abdicated its role as the protector
of the Indian minority from the non-Indian majority.
Judge William Canby26 recently expounded what he
termed four "persistent themes" forming the doctrinal basis of
traditional American Indian law. 2 ' First, tribes are sovereign
entities with inherent powers of self government. Second,
Congress has the power to modify tribal sovereignty and the
status of the tribes. Third, the power to regulate the tribes is
wholly federal; the states are excluded unless Congress delegates power to them. 28 Fourth, the federal government has a
responsibility to protect the tribes and their properties. These
principles, born in the early nineteenth century in a trilogy of
ability has been noted, even by the justices themselves.... Justice Stewart is reported to
have made an extemporaneous comment during a visit to Boalt Hall Law School that
.any case the Court decides in Indian law is stillborn and has no precedential value' ";
Curtis Berkey, Indian Nations Under Assault, 16 HuM. RTs. 18, 19 (Winter 1989-90):
"With the Supreme Court leading the way, the federal courts have pronounced an array
of contradictory rules and principles which have been interpreted by some to undermine
the jurisdictional authority of Indian governments. The doctrine of Indian sovereignty,
which once provided modest protection for self-government, is now so eviscerated that
the powers of those governments are said to exist completely at the whim of the federal
government."
24. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun's dissent and concurrence in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 462 (1989): "While
Justice White's opinion misreads the Court's decisions defining the limits of inherent
tribal sovereignty, Justice Stevens's opinion disregards those decisions altogether."
25. See Pelcyger, supra note 23, at 34. "[T]he Court has not given sufficient
weight to the most fundamental purpose of federal Indian policy: to provide protection
against the more numerous, more aggressive, wealthier, and more technologically advanced elements of the dominant society."
26. The Honorable William C. Canby of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals taught
federal Indian law at Arizona State University and is recognized as an expert in the
field. The Ninth Circuit, encompassing nine western states, contains the vast majority
of American Indians and decides a large number of Indian law cases.
27. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes."
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cases written by Chief Justice Marshall,29 were later supplemented by judicially created canons of construction that demand interpreting ambiguities in treaties and statutes in favor
of Indians. a°
A.

The Abandonment of Precedent

These four established principles survived largely unscathed for more than a century. 3 I But at least three of the
four basic tenets of Indian law have been undermined by
Supreme Court decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts. 2 Judge Canby sees dark clouds on the horizon for
Indian advocates: "While congressional and presidential policy continues to favor self-determination, and increased selfsufficiency and self-government by the tribes, the Supreme
29. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
30. See Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); Alaska Pacific Fisheries
Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). In recent years, even the canons of construction of Indian law have fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court.
[T]he canons are mentioned in form but ignored in substance, probably because they have no contextual linkage and therefore appear rather quaint and
silly, like old maxims in equity. For instance, in Cotton Petroleum [Corp. v.
New Mexico 490 U.S. 163 (1989)] the Court mouthed the canons, but did not
engage in interpretation consistent with them, apparently because the majority
saw no relevant difference between a non-Indian company contracting with a
tribe and one employed by the federal government.
Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning,and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1227-28 (1990) (citation omitted).
31. But see United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882), in which the Court
held that the state of Colorado had jurisdiction over a murder committed on the Ute
Reservation by a non-Indian, upon a non-Indian. This case was seen as a minimal
incursion on tribal sovereignty since it involved solely non-Indians. See Canby, supra
note 27, at 3-5.
32. Justice Rehnquist's hostility toward the tribes is evident in his use of highly
generalized historical evidence to justify the abrogation of Indian treaties without compensation in Sioux Nation v. United States, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
There were undoubtedly greed, cupidity, and other less-than-admirable tactics
employed by the Government during the Black Hills episode in the settlement
of the West, but the Indians did not lack their share of villainy either. It
seems to me quite unfair to judge by the light of "revisionist" historians or the
mores of another era actions that were taken under pressure of time more than
a century ago ....
"The Plains Indians ... lived only for the day, recognized no rights of
property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away with it,
inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching." S.
Morrison, The Oxford History of the American People 539-540 (1965).
Id. at 435-437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court's contemporary posture indicates that these policies are
unlikely to succeed in keeping the tribes free of interference by
state law and state regulation within Indian country. 33 An
examination of the Court's opinions in the area of tribal sovereignty illustrates the Court's challenge to basic Indian law
principles and the damage to Indian interests that challenge
has produced.
1.

Prior Law: The Concept of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty

A century and a half ago, in Worcester v. Georgia,34 Chief
Justice John Marshall set out a clear, geography-based standard that barred application of state law to activities inside
reservation borders, even when non-Indians were involved.35
As recently as 1959, in Williams v. Lee,36 the Court remained
true to that principle, although Justice Black's opinion did impose a limit on Marshall's geography-based bar to state jurisdiction by authorizing application of state law "in cases where
essential tribal relations were not involved and where the
rights of Indians would not be jeopardized."' 37 Nevertheless,
Williams and its progeny interpreted this "essential tribal relations" test broadly, thereby narrowing the exception where
state law can apply. 3a Thus, Williams and its progeny uphold
the general rule of the Worcester case.
2.

McClanahan: The Beginning of the End

Nearly twenty years ago, however, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,3 9 the Court abandoned the "essential tribal relations" test in favor of an examination of
whether federal statutes and Indian treaties "preempted" the
33. Canby, supra note 27, at 22 (citation omitted).
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (non-Indian missionaries living on the Cherokee
reservation were not subject to a Georgia law requiring a license to live on Indian land).
35. Id. at 561.
36. 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (non-Indian operating a store on the Navajo reservation
could not sue an Indian customer for an overdue debt in state court).
37. Id. at 219. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND
THE LAW 1-3 (1987) (discussing Williams v. Lee).
38. Canby, supra note 27, at 6.
39. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state of Arizona could not tax a Navajo's income earned

on the reservation). -
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area the state seeks to regulate. Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall diminished the importance of tribal
sovereignty in deciding conflicts between state and tribal authorities. He wrote: "The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of
the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
be read." 4
Justice Marshall's analysis turned the reasoning of
Worcester, and even Williams, on their heads. While Williams
starts from the presumption that state law does not apply unless the tribe has no "essential relations" with the matter, McClanahan presumes the application of state law which can be
precluded only if federal treaties and statutes preempt the
state.4 1 This test amounts to a mere balancing of state interests against those of the Indians.42 Thus, in one fell swoop,
the Court abandoned two of the four basic principles of Indian
law. Relegating tribal sovereignty to a "backdrop" violated
the first principle: that the tribes are sovereign entities with
inherent powers of self government. 43 The preemption analysis, with its presumption in favor of state law, violated the
third principle: that the power to deal with and regulate the
tribes is exclusively federal. 44
Although the second Justice Marshall considered tribal
sovereignty to be a factor to be balanced in McClanahan, he
remained somewhat true to traditional Indian law principles
by giving the sovereignty interest great weight in his balancing
test.45 But subsequent decisions, written by other members of
the Court, have failed to reflect Justice Marshall's deference to
Indian sovereignty.46
40.
41.

Id. at 172.
See Canby, supra note 27, at 7.

42. Id. at 7, 11. Of the balancing test, Justice Marshall later stated: "State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes with or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at
stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (citation omitted).
43. See Canby, supra note 27, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 12.
46. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (Justice White,
writing for the majority, approved New Mexico's taxation of income, but not the prop-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986609

212

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:203

3. Sovereignty as a Sword, Not a Shield
For example, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Nation,47 Justice White showed little support
for Indian sovereignty in upholding the power of the state of
Washington to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-Indians and resident Indians who were not members of the tribe.
The Court found no preemption of state taxation laws, despite
a federally approved cigarette tax imposed by the tribe.48 As a
result, Justice White simply applied a balancing test, pitting
the tribes' interest in generating revenue against the state's interest in raising tax revenue. He reasoned that the "value" of
the reservation cigarettes was due to the absence of state tax,
so the state had effectively created the value, and consequently
it had the greater interest.49
Tribal sovereignty suffered another significant Supreme
Court attack during the early 1980s. Montana v. United
States,50 effectively relegated tribal sovereignty to second class
status. Montana resurrected a sovereignty-limiting concept
previously employed only when tribes attempted to assert
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 5 1 The Court held that

tribal hunting regulations did not apply to non-Indian hunters
on reservation land owned by non-Indians because the tribes'
"dependent status" was inconsistent with regulation of nonIndians on the reservation.5 2 After Montana, tribal regulation
preempts state law only 1) where necessary to protect tribal
self government or control internal relations, or 2) to protect
erty, from an Indian ski resort located off the reservation); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713
(1983) (Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion that allowed California to regulate liquor sales on reservations; Justice Marshall dissented).
47. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
48. Id. at 144.
49. Id. at 157. Judge Canby has suggested that Colville represents a major dismantling of Indian sovereignty.
[T]he very act of balancing the economic interests of the tribe against those of
the state presumes the legitimacy of regulation by both entities, not only in
Indian country, but in activities in which the tribe is interested and affected
....
[O]nce the Court itself engages in a balancing of interest, intrusions on
previously protected tribal authority are almost inevitable.
Canby, supra note 27, at 14-15.
50. 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1981).
51. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Indian tribe has
no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation).
52. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
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the health and welfare of the tribe, or 3) in consensual rela53
tions such as contracts between non-Indians and Indians.
While ratifying this circumscribed role for tribal regulation, the Court emphasized the tribes' "domestic dependent"
status, a phrase intended originally by Chief Justice Marshall
to guarantee protection of tribal interests, 54 transforming the
concept into a weapon to reduce the tribes' already weakened
ability to control conduct on reservations." Despite a complete lack of evidence of congressional intent to limit the
tribes' power in hunting regulations, the Court eliminated important concepts of sovereignty, simultaneously ignoring prior
case law and the first principle of Indian law.5 6 One commentator described Montana's effect on Indian law in the following terms: "[Montana] added to the growing number of
bewildering statements and principles in this area .... Because of the failure of the Supreme Court to provide clear guidance, the lower federal courts have exercised 57very broad
discretion in deciding these [sovereignty] issues."
An even more drastic, albeit confused, infringement on
tribal sovereignty came in 1989, when a severely-fractured
Court decided Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima.58 Brendale effectively abandoned the Montana concept that tribal regulation can displace state regulation. 9 In
Brendale, two non-Indians who owned property within the
Yakima reservation challenged the tribes' authority to zone
their lands. The Yakima reservation is divided into two sections, one open to the general public, and one closed to anyone
not affiliated with or permitted by the tribe. 6° Petitioner
Brendale's land was in the closed section, while Petitioner
Wilkinson's was in the open area. A majority of the justices
53. Id. at 564-66.
54. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
55. "But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes ...." Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
56. See Canby, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. Berkey, supra note 23, at 21-22.
58. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
59. "It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the economic
security or the health or welfare of the tribe,' than the power to zone." Id. at 458
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 415-16.
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agreed that the tribe retained the authority to zone only the
closed area.61 Three justices and Chief Justice Rehnquist
would have held that because Congress had not delegated zoning authority over non-Indians, the tribe's zoning applied to
neither parcel.62
But perhaps the most astonishing statement in the
Brendale case came in Justice Stevens's concurrence. Justice
Stevens suggested that "[b]ecause the Tribe no longer has the
power to exclude non-members from a large portion of this
area, it also lacks power to define the essential character of the
territory [through zoning]. 63 This position is astonishing because it strips the tribe of its inherent authority to zone reservation land owned by non-members,64 not because of an
explicit congressional statement, or even because of a lack of
federal/Indian preemption, but because of a purported failure
of the tribe to exclude non-Indians. In fact, non-Indians are
on reservations due to misguided congressional policies such
as those embodied in the Dawes Act.65
B.

The Court's Institutional Inability to Consider Indians

In addition to abandoning longstanding principles of federal Indian law, the Supreme Court is a poor choice as ultimate decision-maker in Indian law matters because whenever
61. Id. at 417-18, 432-33. Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall felt the tribe
retained the authority to zone both parcels. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy unsuccessfully argued for a remand of the case as to the closed land, so that
the lower court could examine whether the ability to zone the closed portion of the
reservation fell within the health and welfare category set out in Montana. Brendale,
492 U.S. at 428-33.
63. Id. at 444-45.
64. The power to zone is a part of a sovereign's inherent police powers. See
DANIEL R. MANDELEKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF

LAND DEVELOPMENT 50 (Michie 3d ed. 1990).
65. See ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, §§ 1-6, 8, 10-11 (1887), current version at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49 (1988). Regarding Stevens's concurrence, one commentator wrote:
If applied beyond the zoning context, Justice Stevens's theory would add a
new element to the implicit divestiture concept first announced in 1978 in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. It raises the specter that tribal powers
could be implicitly lost due to changes in the composition and character of the
reservation community, changes caused primarily by larcenous congressional
enactments [such as the Dawes Act] and anachronistic federal policies.
Berkey, supra note 23, at 52.
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the modem Court is faced with a case that implicates the interests of three sovereigns-a tribe, a state, and the federal
government-the Court has proved institutionally incapable
of protecting tribal interests. One might assume that faced
with a conflict among sovereigns, the justices would examine
and balance all three interests, giving great weight to the traditions of tribal sovereignty and federal plenary power to regulate Indian tribes.66 However, the Court seems to give
serious consideration to only two of these sovereigns: the federal government and the state.67 The tribal interests receive
only a passing mention, and no real weight.68
In 1986, Karl Kramer made an exhaustive analysis of the
erosion of tribal sovereignty in recent Supreme Court decisions. 69 Recognizing the demise of Chief Justice Marshall's
rigid doctrine of geographical sovereignty for Indian reservations, as well as subsequent notions of "residual sovereignty," 70 Kramer posited that the modem Court balanced
only two factors in resolving Indian sovereignty cases. First,
the Court accords deference to Congress and to the Execu66. The instances when the Court gives serious weight to tribal sovereignty are
limited almost exclusively to cases where no state has an interest in the outcome of the
case. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). In that case, where the
dispute was between a Pueblo member and the Pueblo itself, the Court gave considerable weight to tribal sovereignty, deciding that an aggrieved member could only sue the
Pueblo under the Indian Civil Rights Act in Pueblo court. The State of New Mexico,
where the Pueblo is situated, had no interest in the case.
67. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (federal and state interests in
regulating reservation liquor sales permit and require state regulation); and see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Nation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
68. But see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
(rejecting California's attempt to apply its penal regulations regarding gambling to two
Tribes' reservation bingo halls and casinos). California's criminal laws applied generally to the tribes through Public Law 280, but the Court held that the state's gambling
laws were civil or regulatory in nature, as opposed to criminal or prohibitory, and therefore had no force on the reservation. This case is reconcilable with the general proposition that the Court enforces state law when state interests are affected: the state had
little interest in prohibiting gambling on the reservations, except for a peripheral concern in preventing the infiltration of organized crime.
69. Karl J. Kramer, Comment, The Most Dangerous Branch: An InstitutionalApproach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional
Determinations, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 989.
70. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 848
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tive .7 When Congress or the Executive creates an explicit law
or rule preserving tribal sovereignty in a particular area or
precluding state jurisdiction by plain language, the Court will
not interfere. This reluctance to intrude is an example of the
exercise of the political question doctrine, under which the
Court will not scrutinize an act taken by another branch when
the Constitution textually grants the discretion to act to that
branch.72 In Indian law, this discretion is found in the text of
both the Indian Commerce Clause, 73 which commits discretion to Congress, and the Treaty Clause, which gives similar
discretion to the Executive (with the concurrence of the
Senate).74
Second, the Court's current analysis seeks to preserve
what Kramer called "representational integrity" for the states
and their citizens." When the Court is presented with a case
76
involving tribal laws affecting non-Indian citizens of a state,
the Court appears to perceive a "political malfunction" 77 and
acts to correct it. A "political malfunction" occurs because
citizens of a state are affected by tribal actions but are unable
to participate in the tribe's political process to address or
change those effects. 8
Charles Wilkinson has shown how concern over "political malfunctioning" has produced Supreme Court decisions
stripping the tribes of important sovereign powers over non71. See Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause, infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
72. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (where the responsibility for organizing, arming, and disciplining the national guard is textually committed to Congress, the Court will not authorize continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities
of the national guard).
73. Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
75. Kramer, supra note 69, at 997.
76. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
77. Kramer, supra note 69, at 998.
78. The Court also perceives a political malfunction when non-member Indians
are subjected to tribal regulations. In such a case, the Court seems to prefer state regulation of the non-member Indians over tribal regulation. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Nation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980) (holding
that the state could tax cigarette sales to non-member Indians as well as non-Indians);
and see Duro v. Reina 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (holding that a tribe does not have criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-member Indians).
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Indians. 79 He notes that some non-Indians living on reservations complain that tribal governments are racist and nondemocratic, refusing non-Indians the right to vote or participate in decision making. As a result, the Supreme Court justices respond to this apparent unfairness by holding that a
tribe lacks jurisdiction over the non-Indians in the first place,
ratifying state law jurisdiction instead. However, Wilkinson
suggests that although non-inclusive tribal governments may
seem unconstitutional, they are more properly "preconstitutional,"8 ° because they embody hundreds of years of pre-Columbian history and culture. Wilkinson contends that judicial
deference to tribal self-government is mandated by well-settled legal precedent as well as European philosophy.
In recent decades, however, the Court has ignored that
precedent and philosophy. The bottom line of the Court's
new bipolar, federal versus state analysis is that when a state
seeks to apply its laws on a reservation, the Court looks first to
see if Congress or the Executive has explicitly retained exclusive jurisdiction for the tribe by treaty or statute. If the federal government has not preempted state law, the Court
evaluates the impact on non-Indians from the activity sought
to be regulated by state law. Where there is some impact offreservation on non-member Indians, or on non-Indians, then
the Court generally upholds state law to avoid the "political
malfunction" that otherwise would occur.81
Although the preservation of "representational integrity"
for non-members and non-Indians may seem at first compelling, much more important tribal interests demand that the
tribes have jurisdiction over non-member reservation resi79.

CHARLES

F.

WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 111-13

(1987).
80. Id. at 112-13.
81. For an example of this bipolar institutional analysis looking to the effect of the
decision, see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Nation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980). In that case, neither Congress nor the Executive had spoken directly to the
issue of cigarette taxes, so the Court looked to utility maximizing behavior by nonIndian cigarette purchasers and to the pricing advantage the tribes would have compared to sellers who were required to collect a state sales tax. Finding that the state had

an interest in raising tax revenue from reservation buyers, the Court upheld a state
cigarette tax on reservation sales of cigarettes. The Court gave no serious examination
to the tribes' interest in increased sales and profits which would flow from a tax exempt
status.
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dents. In a world where the number of non-Indians on reservations is greater than the population of all Indians, 82 the
tribes must retain some degree of regulatory jurisdiction over
non-Indians and non-members; otherwise, the maintenance of
order on reservations by tribal authorities would be nearly impossible without significant involvement of state law enforcement. This very argument was made to the Supreme Court
and rejected by it in Duro v. Reina,83 which held that a tribe
does not have misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-member Indians on the Pima-Maricopa reservation. The decision threw
tribal law enforcement into such a quandary that Congress
quickly was forced to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act 84 to
explicitly overrule the Court's decision. 5 The Court's largely
unrecognized departure from concepts of residual sovereignty,
combined with the inability of the justices even to consider
Indian needs and interests in their decisions, makes it evident
that the Supreme Court is not an appropriate body to decide
issues involving Indian jurisdiction. 6
II. WHY ELIMINATING SUPREME COURT
JURISDICTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A.

The Exceptions Clause

The Constitution's Exceptions Clause provides: "In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make."'8 7 On its face, the clause seems broad enough to
indicate that the framers intended to allow Congress to withdraw Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction for certain classes
82. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2065 (1990).
83. Id.
84. Pub. L. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. 11 1990)).
85. See infra note 161.
86. Despite its apparent inability to consider tribal sovereignty, the Court often
invokes the traditional language about Indian self-government and Indian canons of
construction, without giving either any real effect. Karl Kramer writes: "[T]he Court
may have some difficulty completely breaking with its past doctrines, inasmuch as it
would be gravely embarrassing for the Court to admit that, as a legal institution, it has
no means of incorporating tribal interests into its Indian jurisdictional determinations."
Kramer, supra note 69, at 1031.
87. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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of cases, such as ones involving Indian law. 88 But in a rash of
articles written in the early 1980s, many commentators attacked the premise that Congress possesses such broad power
under the Exceptions Clause.8 9 These articles were written
largely in response to a number of bills introduced in Congress
which would have removed Supreme Court jurisdiction over
cases involving abortion, 9° school prayer,9 1 busing, 92 and the
power of Congress to remove perceived security threats from
government posts. 93 None of the bills passed, 94 but the literature they generated remains, casting some doubt on Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause. This literature
enjoyed wide support and fostered a healthy debate, 95 notwithstanding what appears to be an unquestioned resolution
of the question in the reconstruction-era case of Ex Parte
McCardle.96

In McCardle, the Court dismissed an appeal of a lower
88. Martin H. Redish, CongressionalPower to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27
VILL. L. REV. 900, 901 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: CongressionalAbuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973); Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail FederalCourt Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 895 (1984). Volume 27 of the Villanova Law Review contains a symposium on
the issue, including a number of the leading articles.
90. H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
91. H.R. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
92. H.R. 340, 761 and 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
93. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
94. Many, if not all of these bills would have been subject to challenge as being
unconstitutional on independent grounds. That is, even though the Exceptions Clause
would generally permit the removal of the Court's jurisdiction, the exercise of the Exceptions Clause in a manner that deprives individuals of other constitutional protections, e.g., due process, equal protection, might be independently unconstitutional. See
Laurence H. Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the
Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 139-46 (1981), citing Battaglia v.
General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948):
[T]he exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say,
while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts other than the Supreme Court [in its constitutionally
granted jurisdiction] it must not exercise that power to deprive any person of
life, liberty or property ....
95. "Scholars are sharply divided on the subject and the literature is voluminous."
Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J., dissenting).
96. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus, which had been
brought to challenge the constitutionality of a southern newspaperman's imprisonment by a reconstruction government.
After oral argument of the case, but before the decision was
reached, Congress repealed the Act of 1867 which gave the
Court the authority to review habeas denials from the lower
courts.9 7 The Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear
the appeal because Congress had properly exercised its power
under the Exceptions Clause to curtail the Court's appellate
jurisdiction.98 Chief Justice Chase wrote:
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case before
us, however, is not an inference from the affirmation of
other appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The provision of the Act of 1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly
repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception.99
The opinion recognized that only the Court's jurisdiction
over appeals from denials of habeas corpus was removed by
the repeal of the Act of 1867. °" The Court's authority to
grant a habeas petition under its original jurisdiction, at that
time contained in § 14 of the Judiciary Act, remained intact,
although McCardle's attorney did not pursue this route. 01
Whether the availability of an alternative route to relief was
essential to the Court's ruling remains unknown, and there
has not been a case directly on point since.' 2 However, this
distinction is not critical to the present inquiry, since our proposal for an exception to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
over Indian matters provides for an alternate
federal forum
0 3
for resolving disputes involving Indians.
97. Id. at 516.
98. For an exhaustive analysis of the history and reasoning of the McCardle decision, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L.
REV. 229 (1973).
99. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513-14.
100. Id. at 515.
101. See Van Alstyne, supra note 98, at 246-47.
102. Redish, supra note 88, at 904. However, at least one commentator believes
that the Court again upheld Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). See infra part II.C.
103. See infra the text accompanying notes 169-73, setting out the proposal for an
Indian Court of Appeals.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986609

INDIAN COURT OF APPEALS

1993]

221

B. Possible Limitations of the Exceptions Clause
Exceptions Clause commentators fall generally into three
distinct ideological camps.' 04 The first group relies on Professor Ratner's classic thesis that congressional power to limit
the Court's jurisdiction is limited, if not fully eclipsed, by the
requirement inherent in the structure of the Constitution that
Congress preserve the Court's "essential functions" as the
guardian of supremacy and consistency of federal law. 0 5 The
second group, led by Professor Redish, interprets the clause to
contain no limitation on the plenary power of Congress to
make exceptions to the Court's decision." 6 The third group,
represented by Professor Sager, believes that the clause permits Congress to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction over a
class of cases so long as it allows some federal court to retain

0
jurisdiction over the cases.1

1.

7

The Essential Functions Theory

Those who contend there are significant limits to Congress's power to limit the Court's jurisdiction generally subscribe to Professor Ratner's thesis that the power to make
exceptions to the appellate power does not include the power
to destroy it completely by removing the Court's "essential
functions."' 0 8 Most of these commentators wrote in opposition to a series of bills introduced in Congress that would have
made it impossible for the Court to review certain classes of
cases involving fundamental Constitutional rights. 10 9 Ratner
104. See Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A FederalIndian Law Perspective on CongressionalAuthority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction,
75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 70-71 (1990).
105. See Leonard G. Ratner, CongressionalPower over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
106. See Redish, supra note 88, at 900, passim.
107. Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). The
proposed limitation on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review Indian law cases
should be distinguished from the cases where Congress attempted to preclude any judicial review of its statutes. A debate has long raged over whether Congress may preclude
all judicial review of statutes when those statutes create a violation of Due Process.
See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1936); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). However, that issue is not raised with our proposal.
108. See Ratner, supra note 105, at 202.
109. See supra notes 90-93.
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contended that a removal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction would violate the Exceptions Clause if it deprived the
Court of its ability to supply a forum either (1) for the resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal
law by state and federal courts, or (2) to maintain the
supremacy of federal law." 0 Ratner drew support for his theory in the constitutional debates over the Supremacy and Exceptions Clauses, which, he claimed, indicated that the
framers intended the word "exceptions" be read very narrowly, and to preserve the Supreme Court as the ultimate
guardian of federal supremacy."'
If Ratner's "essential functions" thesis were adopted by
the Court, removal of the Court's jurisdiction over Indian law
would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Indian law often
involves conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and
federal courts;" 2 even more frequently it involves conflicts between state and federal authorities on reservations." 3 Creating a federal Indian Appeals Court would not answer Ratner's
concern that the Supreme Court be the ultimate decision
maker on all issues of federal law. But fortunately, the Court
has never accepted the "essential functions" thesis.
2.

The Plenary Power Theory

Adherents of the plenary power doctrine assert that congressional power to remove the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
over a particular class of cases is essentially unlimited. According to this view, the only limitation on the Exceptions
Clause power is that the removal of jurisdiction cannot violate
other constitutional rights. " 4 The basis of this position lies in
the language of the Exceptions Clause, 5 which contains no
110.

Ratner, supra note 105, at 161.
111. Id. at 161-65. Ratner reconciled his view of the Exceptions Clause with that of
the McCardle Court by pointing to the alternate route to relief available in McCardlean original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court-which would have allowed the
Court to make the ultimate ruling on the constitutionality of his imprisonment and the
reconstruction legislation that enabled it. Id. at 178-80.
112. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
113. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
114. See infra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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textual limitation requiring Congress to preserve the Court's
essential (or any other) function.
Plenary power adherents find Professor Ratner's use of
constitutional history to support such limitations to be unpersuasive for two reasons."1 6 First, although Ratner points to
some ambiguous historical information concerning the framers' intent," 7 this history cannot preserve the Court's "essential functions" where the text provides no hint of such a
limitation.1 8 In fact, Professor Redish notes that the historical information is inconclusive." 9 Second, while Ratner's historical information does suggest that the framers intended
some court to be a check on Congress's actions, there is no
evidence the framers intended that the check necessarily must
be supplied by the Supreme Court. 20 Even if Congress eliminated the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction completely,
the essential judicial role contemplated by the framers would
be preserved by the state and other federal courts which are
21
bound by the Supremacy Clause to follow federal law.'
Many plenary power commentators also draw support from
McCardle as the definitive, affirmative answer to the question
of whether Congress may make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 22 Thus, under the plenary power theory,
eliminating Supreme Court jurisdiction over Indian law cases
and establishing a federal Court of Indian Appeals would not
contravene the Exceptions Clause.
3.

The Distributive Authority Theory

The distributive authority theory is embraced by commentators such as Professors Sagar and Amar who maintain
that the Exceptions Clause gives Congress only the power to
116. See Redish, supra note 88, at 907.
117. Ratner, supra note 105, at 161-65.
118. Redish, supra note 88, at 907.
119. Id. at 908-09.
120. Id. "The specific quotations to which Ratner refers speak only to the authority
of the judicial branch or of 'the Judges' to review congressional legislation." Id. at 909.
121. See Redish, supra note 88, at 912. Leaving the adjudication of Indian law
claims to the state courts would not be consistent with Judge Canby's basic principles,
however. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, 27
VILL. L. REV. 959, 974-75 (1982).
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distribute appellate jurisdiction between the Supreme Court
and other federal courts of appeals. 123 These scholars join
Ratner in looking to the Supremacy Clause as a backdrop for
the Exceptions Clause-requiring some federal forum for the
exertion of federal supremacy. 24 However, they disagree with
Ratner's assertion that the framers intended the Supreme
Court to maintain consistency.125 Along with plenary power
proponents, the distributive authority advocates likely would
not object to the elimination of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over Indian law cases, so long as some federal
court of appeals were empowered to hear the cases.
4.

The Independent Unconstitutionality Theory

Professor Tribe has argued that the other provisions of
the Constitution limit Congress's power under the Exceptions
Clause.1 26 He and others contend that the Constitution does
not allow Congress to use the Exceptions Clause to remove
the shield of federal court review from any particular class of
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 27 Moreover, even Professor Redish maintains the Equal Protection Clause forbids
Congress from removing Supreme Court access for certain
protected suspect classes, such as blacks or aliens, while leav2
ing the others with access to the Court.
Removing Supreme Court jurisdiction over Indian law
cases would not conflict with Professor Tribe's concerns.
123. See Sager, supra note 107 at 17, passim (1981); Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U.
L. REV. 205 (1985).
124. The proposition that there must be a federal forum available for the maintenance of federal supremacy draws support from Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat) 304, 331 (1816), which held that Congress must vest the entire Article III
power in the federal courts and ruled that no class of cases may be removed entirely
from federal jurisdiction.
125. "[A]lthough the constitutional framers were extremely concerned that federal
law be supreme, uniformity in the interpretation of federal law was not one of their
overriding concerns." Worthen, supra note 104, at 77.
126. Tribe, supra note 94, at 139-46.
127. Id. at 145-46. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 98. Professor Redish disagrees
with this conclusion. He notes that while Congress might be barred from restricting
access to the Supreme Court to a class of insular and discrete racial minorities, there is
no such protection for a class of rights. He notes: "[R]ights don't have rights; people
have rights." Redish, supra note 88, at 917.
128. Redish, supra note 88, at 916; Tribe, supra note 94, at 143.
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Even assuming that Indian law cases always involve fundamental rights, Professor Tribe concedes that Congress may remove federal court jurisdiction over a class of protected rights,
so long as (1) it vests an alternative court with jurisdiction to
protect those rights effectively, and (2) the decision to change
the forum for assertion of those rights is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.1 29 Our proposal to remove
the Court's jurisdiction depends on the creation of a new federal tribunal to hear Indian law cases and to order relief for
the protection of fundamental rights. 30 Furthermore, the
proposal is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purpose of protecting Indian sovereignty.' 3 1 Moreover, our
proposal suggests no arbitrary imposition of different judicial
treatment for a protected class of litigants. Indians are not a
protected class; under equal protection analysis, they are a
political, not a racial group. 32 Consequently, the decision to
treat Indian law claims differently should be subject only to a
rational relationship test. And the proposed Indian Court of
Appeals is rationally related to a legitimate state interest because it is based on a desire to correct the unfortunate erosion
of Indian sovereignty effected by the Court in recent years.
5.

Separation of Powers

Our proposal to remove the Court's appellate jurisdiction
over Indian law cases might be thought to violate the separation of powers doctrine. 33 However, limits imposed on jurisdictional alternatives by the separation of powers doctrine are
extremely unlikely in light of two recent cases. In Robertson
129. Tribe, supra note 94, at 145. For the proposition that due process requires
some but not any particular kind of appellate review, see Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972) (Oregon statute requiring tenant ejection disputes to be adjudicated under a
separate statutory procedure is constitutionally permissible).
130. See infra text accompanying note 172.
131. See supra note 25, discussing the Court's inability to fulfill its important role as
the protector of the Indian minority against the non-Indian majority.
132. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 n.24 (1974).
133. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Congress cannot,
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, alter the jurisdiction of a federal
court in order to nullify a presidential pardon). See also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (discussing separation of powers doctrine).
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v. Seattle Audubon Society 13 4 and Mistretta v. United States,15
the Court appeared willing to defer to congressional legislation that cabins judicial power.
In Seattle Audubon, a unanimous Court upheld an appropriations bill rider 136 that effectively directed two federal
courts to stop an ongoing lawsuit seeking to enjoin timber
sales in spotted owl habitat in Washington and Oregon. The
Ninth Circuit held that the law violated the separation of
powers doctrine because it directed a particular outcome in
ongoing litigation without expressly amending the underlying
environmental statutes on which the litigation was based. 37
But a unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
rider constituted an effective repeal of the underlying environmental laws for those timber sales, despite the Court's
longstanding aversion to implied repeals contained in appropriations bills. 138 Although Justice Thomas claimed the case
presented "no occasion to address any broad question of Article III jurisprudence," ''39 the case indicates that the Court
generally will defer to congressional attempts to remove subject matter jurisdiction from the courts, even in pending cases.
In Mistretta, the Court upheld the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, which shifted most responsibility for determining
sentences for federal crimes from individual judges to a Sentencing Commission comprised of federal judges and other appointees. Mistretta, who was sentenced under the resulting
guidelines, challenged the law as a violation of the separation
of powers doctrine, because, he claimed, the Act made an unconstitutionally broad delegation of rule-making power and
because it unduly burdened the Article III judges who were
appointed to the Commission.14°
134.

112 S.Ct. 1407 (1992).

135.

488 U.S. 361 (1989).

136.
101-121,
137.
lying on

Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L.
§ 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989).
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990) (reKlein v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1407

(1992).
138. Seattle Audubon, 112 S.Ct. at 1413-14; and see Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
139. Seattle Audubon, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
140. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 362-68, 370-71.
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The Court rejected these arguments because it found the
delegation of power to the Commission to be sufficiently narrow and principled t41 and because the judges appointed were
uniquely well qualified to perform the Commission's task and
would not be unduly burdened by the additional responsibilities. 142 Justice Blackmun concluded: "The Constitution has
never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality which will enable it to
perform its function."' 43 Although the majority rejected the
challenge, Justice Scalia in dissent noted that the Court had
recently backed away from the separation of powers doctrine,
allowing Congress to tinker with constitutional checks and
balances. '44
As discussed above,1 45 two of the three basic Exceptions
Clause ideologies would permit the removal of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction over Indian law cases, so long as a federal
appeals court is available to hear the cases and ensure the
supremacy of federal law. And while the "essential functions"
thesis would likely reject our proposal, this thesis is based on
46
questionable evidence from the constitutional convention,
and has been criticized as being created from wholly new constitutional cloth, without textual support. 47 Most commentators agree that the question of congressional control over
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction remains largely open because Congress has not passed a law explicitly removing fed'4
eral jurisdiction over a class of cases since McCardle. 1
141.
142.
143.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 372 (citations omitted).

144.

"Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent separation-of-

powers jurisprudence... to treat the Constitution as though it were no more than a
generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled
too much - how much is too much to be determined, case-by-case, by this Court. The
Constitution is not that." Id. at 426 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
145. See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text, discussing the plenary power
theory and the distributive authority theory.
146. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Con-

gress has, without judicial objection, removed non-subject-matter-specific federal jurisdiction, such as when it increased the minimum amount in controversy to $50,000 for
diversity actions in 1988. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by Pub L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4646 (1988).
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Consequently, the Court has not had a subsequent opportunity to address the Exceptions Clause directly. There is,
how149
ever, at least one dissenter from the latter contention.
C.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: A Modern
McCardle?

Professor Worthen believes that the 1978 case of Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,'50 represents an implicit ratification
of Congress's power to remove federal jurisdiction over a class
of cases' 51-those brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA). 15 2 If Worthen is correct in his reading of Santa
Clara Pueblo, Supreme Court precedent already supports the
removal of the Court's jurisdiction over all Indian law cases.
In Santa Clara Pueblo, a female member of the Pueblo
sought a federal court injunction against the enforcement of a
Pueblo ordinance that denied membership to her daughter because the mother married a non-member. The mother alleged
illegal discrimination under the ICRA, because under the ordinance, the child of a man who married outside the Pueblo
could become a member. The Supreme Court ruled that, consistent with the unique relationship between the tribes and the
federal government and Congress's respect for tribal sovereignty, Congress intended tribal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the ICRA. As a result, no ICRA action
could be brought in federal court, except in a habeas corpus
53
action.
Professor Worthen points out that the Santa Clara
Pueblo Court interpreted the statute's express authorization of
relief in a non-federal, Indian forum to preclude implied relief
in a federal forum. 54 He concludes that in doing so, the
149. See infra part II.C.
150. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
151. Worthen, supra note 104, at 67-68.
152. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). This Act extends to members
of Indian tribes many of the guarantees of the bill of rights and the fourteenth amendment, with the notable exception of the right to counsel at government expense in a
criminal proceeding. The bill of rights and fourteenth amendment had been held not to
apply to the tribes in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
153. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66, 70 (1978).
154. Worthen, supra note 104, at 89-90. Examining the Committee Report on the
ICRA, the Court stated: "Thus, it appears that the Committee viewed [the ICRA] as
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Court implicitly upheld the congressional power to remove
federal jurisdiction over a certain class of cases arising under
federal law.
Thus, when Congress vests exclusive jurisdiction over
claims arising under federal law in tribal courts, it implicitly precludes article III federal court judicial review of
such claims - the very act over which the abstract debate
[concerning the Exceptions Clause] has thus far revolved.
According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Clara
Pueblo, Congress took that unprecedented step when it
enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act. 55
If Professor Worthen is correct in claiming that Congress
could remove a class of Indian law cases from federal jurisdiction entirely, then it must follow that Congress has the power
to remove such cases from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, as we suggest, for under our proposal Indian cases
would still be decided by Article III courts.
III.

IS OUR PROPOSAL POLITICALLY FEASIBLE?

If either the plenary power or the distributive authority
theory accurately describes the scope of congressional power
under the Exceptions Clause, Congress has the constitutional
authority to remove Indian law claims from Supreme Court
jurisdiction and to vest that jurisdiction in an alternative federal tribunal.1 16 According to Professor Worthen, Congress
enforceable only on habeas corpus and in tribal forums." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S.
at 70, n.28.
155. Worthen, supra note 104, at 85 (footnote omitted).
156. Congress has often exercised its power to set up Article I and III courts of
special jurisdiction to deal with particular legal issues. See United States Claims Court,
revised by Congress in 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1988); United States Court of International Trade, originally established in 1926 as the United States Customs Court and
modified in 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1988); United States Court of Military Appeals,
established in 1956, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1988); United States Tax Court, established in
1969, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1988); United States Court of Veterans Appeals, established in
1988, 38 U.S.C. § 4051 (1988).
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) Amendments of
1972, Pub. Law No. 92-500, § 9, 86 Stat. 816, 899 (1972) "The President... shall make
a full and complete investigation and study of the feasibility of establishing a separate
court, or court system, having jurisdiction over environmental matters ...." The Attorney General's resulting report did not, however, recommend establishing the environmental court. See Harold Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 517 (1974).
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already has done so with a certain class of Indian law
claims-those arising under the ICRA. 157 The unanswered
question is whether Congress actually will exercise its Exceptions Clause power to create (or broaden) that existing exception to the Court's appellate jurisdiction to encompass all
Indian law cases.
History, of course, is replete with examples of Congress
trampling Indian rights and interests.158 But examples also
exist of Congress showing sensitivity to the Indian people by
rescuing certain tribes whose interests have been ignored by
the courts and federal agencies159 or threatened by land-hungry white settlers.' ° Recently, Indians have been successful
sometimes in pushing for beneficial legislative change, 16' a re157. See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., The Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), which gave the President authority to allocate reservation lands to individual Indians. This eventually led to alienation of a significant percentage of what was formerly reservation land. See generally
Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianshipover
American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976).
159. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 1, 92
Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)). Passed in 1978, this Act made it
the policy of the United States to protect and preserve Indian sacred sites and the rights
to practice their religion, but contained no enforcement mechanism. See generally Ellen
M. W. Sewell, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 429
(1983); Diane Brazen Gould, Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting Native American Religion, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 869 (1986).

160. See Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, which provided the New Mexico Pueblo Indians compensation for lands that had been taken by white settlers. The Act of 1933 later
supplemented the Pueblo Lands Act to ensure that the pueblos were receiving fair market value for their lands, and that the all important aboriginal water rights were included. Act of June 7, 1924, Pub. L. No. 253 ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636; Act of May 31,
1933, Pub. L. No. 28 ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108. See Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18
N.M. L. REV. 403, 438, at nn.256-57 (1988). See also Indian Claims Commission Act
of 1946, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v (1988) (waiving sovereign immunity for Indian claims
against the United States, and setting up a panel of claims commissioners who adjudicated the Indian claims with review by the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court)
although the administration of both laws was of questionable value to the tribes. According to New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985),
aff'd, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976) and Dann v. United States, 470 U.S. 39 (1985)
both the Pueblo Lands Act and the Indian Claims Commission Act were intended to
correct congressionally recognized injustices toward Indians.
161. See, e.g., Amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104
Stat. 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. II 1990)); see also Proposed
Amendments to American Indian Religious Freedom Act, S. 110, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991). The proposed bill is intended to reverse the Supreme Court's decisions in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (no violation of
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flection of their growing political influence. For example, after the Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina 162 that Indian

tribes do not have criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes, Congress hurriedly amended the
ICRA in a Department of Defense appropriations bill.' 63 The
amendment redefined "powers of self government" given to
the tribes to include criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
This demonstrated that political power could be channelled
into a successful push for a new forum for the assertion of
Indian legal claims. As Professor Wilkinson has pointed out,
Indians have underestimated political clout, especially among
Western congressmen, derived not from the number of tribal
members, but from their remarkable holdings of western land
and water rights.164 In the West, land and water rights often
equal political power.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL: THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF INDIAN APPEALS
A number of commentators 165 have called for the United
free exercise of religion clause when Forest Service builds a road near a sacred Indian
burial ground) and Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990) (state denial of unemployment benefits from recipient who had been fired
for using peyote did not violate free exercise clause). The law would prohibit any state
laws making use or possession of sacred peyote illegal and provide consultation with
Indian authorities before destruction of sacred sites. See Kristen L. Boyles, Note, Saving SacredSites: The 1989 ProposedAmendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117, 1119 n.14 (1991).
See also Frickey, supra note 30, at 1238. "From the Indian perspective, Supreme
Court decisions, not congressional action, have produced the most significant Indian
losses in the past two decades." Id.
162. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
163. Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301
(Supp. 11 1990)).
164. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American West: A Critical Bibliography
of the Nonlegal Sources, 85 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955 (1987). Perhaps the tribes' most
valued political asset is their reserved water rights. Under the Winters doctrine, along
with the creation of Indian reservations, Congress impliedly reserved enough water
from streams to irrigate all of the reservations' practicably irrigable acres. Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See generally 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
§§ 37.01(b)(2), 37.02(a)(1) (discussing Winters); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE
BIRD 37 (1992).
165. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Jurisprudence, 1986
Wis. L. REV. 219, 293-99 (Professor Williams argues that there is an inherent immorality to forcing Indian tribes, whom we regard to some extent to be sovereign, to adjudi-
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States to abandon completely its colonial, discovery-based 166
hegemony over Indian affairs that began with the case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh.167 This, they claim, would make it possible to adopt a jurisprudence that is more rational, more respectful of congressional intent, and more consistent with
modem theories of human rights. Some have called for this
reordering of Indian law by radical measures, such as treating
the tribes as foreign nations with full sovereignty and dealing
with them in an impartial forum such as the International
Court of Justice. 16 The reform suggested here is not quite so
radical, but might serve the purpose of returning some semblance of fairness and rationality to Indian law.
We propose that Congress exercise its power under the
Exceptions Clause 169 to remove from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction the class of cases dealing with federal questions involving Indian law. We further propose that Congress
exercise its powers under Article III of the Constitution 7 ° to
create an Indian Court of Appeals, vested with the jurisdiction
taken from the Supreme Court, and to which appeals may be
taken from the circuit courts of appeals.
Congress could staff the court in one of two ways, depending on the fiscal concerns of the day. A fiscally-conservative means would be to select sitting federal judges for
temporary membership on the Indian Court of Appeals on the
cate their claims against the United States in the courts of the very government they
oppose in litigation); Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution:The Original
Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57 (1991) (encouraging Indians to work to
modify long accepted legislation and judicial decisions that further the destruction of
Indian sovereignty and self-determination).
166. The Court has rationalized extinguishing Indian title to land by use of the
discovery doctrine that dictates whichever European nation discovers land in the new
world has the right to divest the natives of title and claim it for the conquering country.
See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-94 (1823).
167. Id.
168. See Williams, supra note 165, at 295-97. "An unfettered access to international domestic legal forms could provide tribes with the political leverage needed to
force their colonizers to defend their abusive, anarchronistic [sic] and racist vision of
Indian status and rights before the world community." Id. See also Steven Paul McSloy, American Indians and the Constitution: An Argument for Nationhood, 14 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1990).
169. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
170. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
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basis of their experience and interest in Indian law. The
judges might convene once a year to hear oral arguments and
could conduct the rest of their responsibilities from their respective circuits and districts. The obvious benefit of this alternative would be the cost saved from not having to employ
and compensate a whole new slate of federal judges. A potential drawback might be that these judges could incur an increased case load as a result of their additional duties.
A second alternative would be to appoint new judges.
The legislation might solicit nominations for membership on
the new court from all interested groups: tribes, states, resource users, the judiciary, the Senate, the Indian law bar, and
academia. Like all other Article III judges, however, the
President would nominate subject to confirmation by the Senate.171 The benefit of this plan would be having judges who
could devote nearly all their time and energy to Indian law.
The downside might be, however, that narrow political interests might successfully lobby Congress and the President to
staff the court with judges who support a certain political
position.
The jurisdiction of the court and the corresponding parameters of the removal of Supreme Court jurisdiction would
be limited to questions of federal law in cases where (1) any
party is a member of a tribe; (2) the issue concerns an Indian
reservation; an Indian's or tribe's land, water, or other property; or involves an Indian government; or (3) the dispute
originates in Indian country. 172 The judgment of the Indian
171. Making the members full Article III judges, with salary and tenure protection
would assuage the concerns of adherents of the distributive authority theory who, according to Worthen, believe that for Congress to remove the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over a class of cases, it must provide an alternative forum staffed with federal
Article III judges with all the accompanying institutional protections. See Worthen,
supra note 104, at 78, citing Amar, supra note 123, at 248-50.
172. "Indian country" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988), which provides as
follows:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependant Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
throughout the same.
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Court of Appeals would be the ultimate and final determination of the case, binding on all United States circuit and district courts. The Supreme Court would be barred from taking
appeal either directly or by certiorari. In order to maintain
the integrity of the judicial system, the Indian Court of Appeals would be bound by the previous Indian law decisions of
the Supreme Court, but would be free to consider expansions
and changes in the law, consistent with the concept of stare
173
decisis.
As we argue above, there are ample reason and adequate
constitutional grounds for the proposed legislation. Whether
there ever will be a Congress and a President with the political
will and a real understanding of the problems arising out of
the Supreme Court's shortsightedness in the field of Indian
law is, however, a question to which we have no answer.
V. CONCLUSION
Suggesting that Congress eliminate Supreme Court jurisdiction over a category of cases is not a proposal we make
lightly. But another decade of Supreme Court Indian law decisions will surely continue the erosion of the concept of tribal
sovereignty into a kind of shadow sovereignty. Court decisions which deprive tribes of their ability to control activities
affecting their reservations undermine the tribes' status as
"nations within nations"'' 74 which Chief Justice Marshall recognized more than a century and a half ago, and these decisions do so irretrievably. Because the Rehnquist Court seems
not to recognize Justice Black's promise that "great nations,
like great men, keep their word," 175 we suggest that Congress
create an Indian Court of Appeals to supplant Supreme Court
jurisdiction over Indian cases.
Our proposed Indian Court of Appeals is well within
Congress's authority under the Exceptions Clause, will ensure
173. While some might argue that this would lock in a wide array of "bad" Indian
law, it should be noted that in none of the Court's recent decisions critiqued above did
the Court expressly overrule the pre-Burger Court cases recognizing tribal sovereignty.
In most cases, the Court has simply distinguished the recent cases on their facts, and the
Indian Court of Appeals would be free to do the same.
174. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
175. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J. dissenting).
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national uniformity of Indian law, and might provide a useful
case study of one way to manage the Supreme Court's overloaded docket. Perhaps even more important, the Indian
Court of Appeals will ensure that Indian cases are decided by
jurists who believe Indian law is a central reflection of American society's tolerance and wisdom. We believe the proposal
warrants serious consideration by Indian peoples and
Congress.
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